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State Sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment: Refining the Analysis
Michael A. Mass*
I. Introduction
Defining the limits of congressional power to regulate the states
has long proved to be constitutionally troublesome. On March 2,
1983, the United States Supreme Court in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) v. Wyoming' revisited this question
and significantly strengthened congressional power in areas that ar-
guably interfere with traditional state sovereignty. This development
is particularly important when viewed in the context of recent Su-
preme Court decisions in this area, most notably National League of
Cities v. Usery.' In National League of Cities the Court held that
the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,3 which
amendments extended the statute's coverage to state and local em-
ployees,' impermissibly would "alter or displace the state's ability to
structure employer-employee relationships"5 and thus "impermissi-
bly [would] interfere with the integral governmental functions of
these bodies"' in contravention of the tenth amendment.
7
The primary issue presented in EEOC v. Wyoming was whether
the tenth amendment analysis employed in National League of Cit-
ies extends to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)8
* B.S. 1970, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania;
J.D. 1973, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is an Associate Professor of Busi-
ness Law at The American University, Washington, D.C., and is engaged in the private prac-
tice of law in that city.
1. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983), rev'g 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d)-(s),-(x) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
6. Id.
7. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U. S. CONST. amend.
X.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). In 1974, the ADEA was amended to include states and
subdivisions of states as employers. Id. § 630(b). In 1978, Congress amended the ADEA to
prevent mandatory retirement at any age between 40 and 70 years unless (I) mandatory re-
tirement is required by a reasonable factor other than age, or (2) age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1)(2), 631(a)(Supp. V 1981).
when that act is applied to a Wyoming statute requiring game war-
dens to retire at age fifty-five. 9 At issue was congressional power,
presumably under the commerce clause,10 to prohibit a state from
discriminating against older workers by providing mandatory retire-
ment. The State argued that the ADEA impermissibly restricts a
state's prerogative as employer to structure a retirement system for
law enforcement officers and thus violates the tenth amendment." A
second issue presented in EEOC v. Wyoming arose from the EEOC's
claim that the ADEA was enacted not only pursuant to the com-
merce clause, but also as an exercise of congressional power under
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
This article first examines the issue of state sovereignty and the
history of the constitutional theory that the tenth amendment creates
an affirmative limitation upon congressional power to regulate under
the commerce clause." Then explored is the alternative of congres-
sional regulation under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, legis-
lative authority that is not limited by the tenth amendment.' 4 Fi-
nally, this article describes and analyzes the significance of the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement addressing state sover-
eignty's conflict with the exercise of congressional power."5
II. The Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on the Commerce
Clause
Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,'6 defined the
power granted Congress in the commerce clause as "the power to
regulate; that is to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed.' 7 Chief Justice Marshall further stated that congressional
power under the commerce clause was "plenary"' 8 in scope and "ac-
knowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution."'
For a time, the Court intermittently invalidated federal statutes
9. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement
Act,Wyo. STAT.§§ 31-3-101 to 31-3-121 (1977). The Act mandates the involuntary retirement
at age 55 of game wardens who serve as full time law enforcement officers. Id. § 31-3-107(c).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. Brief for Appellee at 3, EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
12. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5. The tenth amendment does not bar "ap-
propriate" federal legislation passed pursuant to section 5. See infra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
13. See infra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 56-99 and accompanying text.
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. Id. at 196.
18. Id. at 197 (dictum).
19. Id. at 196. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-1 to 5-8
.(1978).
that interfered with a state's reserved powers to regulate its internal
affairs. Thus, when Congress regulated private economic matters,
the Court interpreted the commerce clause narrowly.20 When, how-
ever, the federal statute was designed to safeguard the public health,
safety or morality from dangerous products or services, the Court
sustained the federal action on the theory that federal police powers
outweigh state sovereignty objections.3 1
In 1941, the Court unanimously refused to view the tenth
amendment as an express limitation upon federal power in United
States v. Darby.' By upholding the constitutionality of federal wage
and hour controls 8 as applied to purely intrastate transactions, the
Court radically reinterpreted the tenth amendment by proclaiming
as follows:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the re-
lationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or
that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new na-
tional government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their re-
served powers.
24
It appeared that Darby finally and permanently removed any ques-
tions regarding the extent of the tenth amendment limitation of Con-
gressional power under the commerce clause."6
20. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (commerce clause held
insufficient to allow regulation of employment terms in intrastate coal production); Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (federal economic regulation of intrastate
poultry industry held unconstitutional); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (federal
child labor law that regulated articles in interstate commerce produced at factories in violation
of statute held unconstitutional),overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The
Court in Dagenhart expanded the tenth amendment analysis to limit the commerce clause
unless an express delegation of federal power is found to exist. Id. at 275.
21. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (regulation of automobiles
upheld); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act upheld, precluding in-
terstate movement of women for illegal purposes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911) (Pure Food and Drug Act upheld); Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case), 188 U.S.
321 (1903) (federal prohibition of interstate sale of lottery tickets upheld).
22. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The rejection of this view was indicated in NLRB v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act of 1935 upheld
against tenth amendment challenge). See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause and the Na-
tional Economy, 193346, 59 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1946). It has been suggested that the deci-
sions in Darby and Jones & Laughlin avoided a constitutional crisis, "spelled defeat for the
Court-packing plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution." National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S? 833, 867-68 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
24. United States v. Darby, 212 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION 1907-08 (2d ed. 1951).
25. For post-Darby cases sustaining federal legislation over challenges predicated upon
state sovereignty, see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding national wage
In 1976, however, a bitterly divided Supreme Court announced
its plurality decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.26 The
Court held that congressional imposition of wage and hour restric-
tions on state employment directly displaced the states' "freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions. 27 Not since 1936 had the Court struck down federal leg-
islation promulgated pursuant to the commerce clause.2 8 By resur-
recting the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation on the
commerce clause, the Court recognized a "constitutional barrier" 9
to certain federal regulations "directed not to private citizens, but to
the States as States."80 The plurality opinion immunized the states
from congressional regulation and declared that "neither government
may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the ex-
ercise of its powers." 31
Justice Brennan characterized this "startling restructuring of
our federal system" as a "catastrophic judicial body blow" to con-
gressional power under the commerce clause. 2 He further described
the plurality opinion as a "mischievous decision," 33 "so ominous for
our constitutional jurisprudence as to leave one incredulous." a Per-
haps the decision is somewhat less ominous than Justice Brennan
suggests because a majority could only be sustained with the vote of
Justice Blackmun, who interpreted the plurality decision as adopting
a "balancing approach."3 5 Although the plurality recognized that
emergency situations could present circumstances necessitating fed-
eral regulation despite interference with state sovereignty,36 Justice
Blackmun insisted that federal regulation may be upheld even in
nonemergency situations if the federal interest is "demonstrably
freeze to state and local employees); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending coverage to employees of state schools
and hospitals), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Of course congressional power pursuant to the commerce clause is not without limit. See,
e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (due process clause of the fifth amendment
limitation); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (sixth amendment limitation).
26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
27. 426 U.S. at 852.
28. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
29. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976).
30. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 844 (citing Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)).
32. Id. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices
White and Marshall. Justice Stevens authored a separate dissenting opinion.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 875.
35. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This approach is vigorously criticized by Jus-
tice Brennan as "a thinly veiled rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment
that our system of government reserves to Congress." Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. See Id. at 853, distinguishing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), which
upheld the Economic Stabilization Act of 1960 as applied to temporary wage freeze of state
and local government employees.
greater" than the state's interest and state compliance is
"essential."8
In the recent case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Association,"s the Court clarified the test for determining
whether congressional action is limited by the tenth amendment and
enunciated the following three tests: 1) Does the statute regulate the
"States as States";39 2) does the statute regulate matters that are
"attributes of state sovereignty";' 0 and 3) does the state's compli-
ance directly impair its ability "to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional functions." 4' The Hodel Court noted, however,
that these tests together are only a preface to the balancing of the
federal interest against the state interest.4
III. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment: An Alternative
Analysis
In National League of Cities, the Court noted that its tenth
amendment analysis applies only to congressional exercise of author-
ity granted in the commerce clause and not to legislation enacted
pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment s.4  Section 5 em-
powers Congress to enforce by "appropriate legislation" the substan-
tive provisions of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment.4 Clearly,
37. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
38. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). For discussions of the difficulties in applying the National
League of Cities standard, see Matsumato, National League of Cities - From Footnote to
Holding - State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35; Beard
& Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, II GA. L.
REv. 35 (1976); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities v. Usery: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977);
Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U.
COLO. L. REv. 467 (1977); Note, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League of Cities v.
Usery, 57 B.U.L. REv. 178 (1977).
39. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976).
40. Id. at 845.
41. Id. at 852.
42. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n. 29
(1981). The Court stated as follows: "Demonstrating that these three requirements are met
does not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce
power action will succeed. There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies State submission." The Court has noted the "balancing
test" in other recent cases also. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S.
678, 684 n. 9 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763 n.28 (1982). Other courts have
also adopted the balancing approach. See, e.g., Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914,
915 (D.N.D. 1977); Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977),
affd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980);
Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. 426 U.S. 833, 852 n. 17 (1976). The Court also expressly refused to discuss legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to the spending power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
44. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
the tenth amendment does not limit congressional exercise of power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In the same week as
its decision in National League of Cities, the Court decided a civil
rights issue in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.4 5 Therein the Court declared
that congressional power under section 5 was constitutionally in-
tended as a limitation upon state authority. 46 As far back as 1880,
the Supreme Court recognized that both the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments "were intended to be . . . limitations of the
power of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."4 .
After National League of Cities, litigants, like the EEOC, who have
confronted tenth amendment objections to federal legislation have
sought a judicial determination that the relevant statute constitutes a
proper exercise of power pursuant to section 5.4a The difficulty with
this approach for the ADEA is that the 1974 amendments to the
ADEA' 9 extending coverage to state employees did not expressly
rely upon section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The statute con-
strued in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer clearly relied on an express statement
of section 5 intent.50 Thus, further judicial deliberation was neces-
sary to establish a test for determining the applicability of that
intent.
In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,51 Justice Rehnquist,
who also authored the plurality opinion in National League of Cities
and the opinion in Fitzpatrick, had an opportunity to discuss this
issue. Writing for the majority in Pennhurst, Justice Rehnquist de-
clined to "attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 In Pennhurst,
the Court construed a federal statute 5  to determine if that statute
was adopted pursuant to section 5 rather than the spending power
45. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
46. Id. at 456.
47. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238-39 (1972); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
48. See, e.g., Arnett v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Board of Educ.
of Salt Lake City, 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D.
Ark. 1976); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1976). Contra Morgan v.
Dep't. of Offender Rehab., No. C81-2118A (N.D. Ga. March 31, 1982); Taylor v. Dep't. of
Fish & Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont. 1981); Usery v. Manchester E. Catholic Regional
School Bd., 430 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.H. 1977).
49. See supra note 2. For an argument that the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ments implies section 5 reliance, see Brief for Appellant at 23-27, 514 F. Supp. 595.
50. At issue in Fitzpatrick were the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h-6 (1970 and Supp. IV), which had a legislative history expressly
basing authority on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1971).
51. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
52. Id. at 16.
53. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6010 (1976 & Supp. III).
clause;54 if the statute was adopted pursuant to section 5, it applied
to all states, even those that did not accept federal funds. It is un-
clear whether the Court would apply Pennhurst to a case involving
the constitutional underpinnings of congressional action rather than
a practical rule of statutory construction."
IV. The District Court Decision in EEOC v. Wyoming
The principal dispute in EEOC v. Wyoming was a challenge to
the constitutionality of the ADEA as it applies to state employees
and conflicts with a Wyoming statute5 7 requiring involuntary retire-
ment of game wardens at age fifty-five. Bill Crump, a game warden,
was involuntarily retired at age fifty-five and filed a charge of unlaw-
ful age discrimination with the EEOC. The Commission filed suit in
federal district court and sought a declaratory judgment that Wyo-
ming was engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of
the ADEA. The Commission also sought injunctive relief, back
wages and damages.58
District Judge Brimmer dismissed the complaint and ruled that
the extension of the ADEA to the states was based solely upon the
commerce clause and that its application to state law enforcement
officers was banned by the tenth amendment principles discussed in
National League of Cities. Noticeably absent from the court's opin-
ion is the three-pronged Hodel analysis, which was discussed in
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co." The
trial court never explained precisely how the prohibition against age
discrimination interfered with "attributes of state sovereignty" 60 or
how conformity with ADEA would impair directly the state's ability
"to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.""1
Rather, the court focused exclusively on the nature of law en-
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
55. In Pennhurst, the Court engaged in statutory construction to determine if the act
created substantive rights, which were enforceable by the mentally retarded and which re-
quired, by implication, the expenditure of substantial state revenue. 451 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981).
56. 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
57. Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, Wyo.
STAT. §§ 31-3-101 to 31-3-121 (1977). Full time law enforcement officers are retired involun-
tarily at age 55, but they may continue in service on a year-to-year basis until age 65 "with
the approval of the employer and under conditions as the employer may prescribe." Id. § 31-3-
107(c) (1977).
58. The district court dismissed the personal action against the Governor of Wyoming,
the Game and Fish Commission members and directors and the Director of the Game and
Fish Department. The court commented that the federal agency's is quest for personal judg-
ments against voluntary Commission members offended the court's sense of fair play. More-
over, personal liability was precluded by a qualified privilege or immunity. EEOC v. Wyoming,
514 F. Supp. 595, 596 (1981).
59. 455 U.S. 678 (1982). For a discussion of the three-pronged Hodel test, see supra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
60. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
61. Id. at 852.
forcement and wildlife management as traditional state activities
and did not discuss the manner in which enforcement of the ADEA
would impair such activities." Furthermore, the district court opin-
ion did not explain why the ADEA provision permitting mandatory
retirement upon a showing that age is a "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) failed to protect the state from the onus of
forced retention of less than qualified older employees.63 Thus, the
court did not support its statement that the state would be "saddled"
with additional costs by keeping workers on for ten additional
years."
Judge Brimmer did discuss the "balancing approach" set forth
in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National League of Cit-
ies. 5 He refused to rely, however, on the EEOC's assertion that the
national interest outweighed the intrusion upon state sovereignty.
The district court strongly emphasized that the federal government
requires certain law enforcement employees to retire at age fifty-
five6" and that Wyoming game wardens engage in law enforcement.
Thus, according to Judge Brimmer, the federal government requires
the states to "do as the United States says, but not as it does."67
The district court flatly rejected the assertion that the ADEA
was passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment." Af-
ter reviewing the legislative history of the ADEA, the court found
adequate expression of commerce clause intention and no evidence
that Congress acted pursuant to section 5.69 The court relied on Pen-
62. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981).
63. See 29 U.S.C. 623(0(1), (3) (1976 & Supp. III). On appeal Wyoming argued that
the BFOQ was no protection for the state, which must confront difficult evidentiary issues
requiring a "battle of experts" with inconsistent results. Brief for Appellee at 15-16, 514 F.
Supp. 595. See EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (1ith Cir. 1982) (age BFOQ for
firefighters but not for district fire chiefs); Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ala. 1981)
(age not BFOQ for highway patrol); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287 (D.
Md. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982) (age not BFOQ for firefighters); Beck v. Man-
heim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E. D. Pa. 1981) (age BFOQ for city police).
64. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (1981). It was argued that, since no
worker is required to be retained who cannot perform his or her job, no increased employment
costs would be incurred. See Brief for Appellant at 13 n.5.
65. Id. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 597. The U.S. Postal Service requires certain law enforcement officers to retire
at age 55. 5 U.S.C. §8335(b) (1976 and Supp. V). See Thomas v. United States Postal Inspec-
tion Serv., 647 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1981). In Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), the
Court upheld the mandatory retirement of foreign service employees at age 60.
67. Id.
68. For a discussion of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and its significance see
notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
69. The ADEA was passed pursuant to a legislative determination that arbitrary age
discrimination burdens interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §621(a) (1976 and Supp. V). The rem-
edies and enforcement procedures of the ADEA also are entwined with those of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201-19 (1976 & Supp. V) which was clearly passed pursuant to
the commerce clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976 & Supp. V). The EEOC argued that there is
some legislative evidence that the ADEA was passed pursuant to section 5. See Brief for Ap-
pellant at 23-27, 514 F. Supp. 595.
nhurst for the proposition that a clear statement of legislative intent
is necessary before legislation can be regarded as having been passed
pursuant to section 5.70
This broad construction of Pennhurst was an important issue on
appeal. The EEOC argued that Pennhurst should be read narrowly
to apply only to the questions whether a federal statute creates cer-
tain substantive rights in citizens, and whether the statute applies to
all states or only to those accepting federal funds.7 1 The EEOC as-
serted that in cases like Pennhurst, to imply that Congress was act-
ing pursuant to section 5 not only would explain the theoretical con-
stitutional basis, but also would alter the practical effect of the
statute. In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court found a clear congressional
intent supporting imposition of the ADEA upon the states. The only
remaining issue was the constitutional basis for the congressional ac-
tion. The EEOC argued that nothing in the Constitution "requires
Congress to generate a legislative history" to identify the constitu-
tional basis for its action 2 and that Congress should be presumed to
have acted pursuant to whatever power it possessed. The EEOC thus
argued that Congress acted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
7 3
On appeal, Wyoming argued that Congress does not have such
power. Further, even if Congress had intended to use its section 5
power, the ADEA was not "appropriate legislation" under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 4 Wyoming also ar-
gued that the ADEA diluted the guarantees of the equal protection
clause by limiting the Act's coverage exclusively to individuals be-
tween the ages of forty and seventy years. Thus, the ADEA abro-
gated the protection of the equal protection clause for those individu-
als outside this "protected class.' Wyoming supported this
argument by suggesting that the ADEA was analogous to hypotheti-
cal legislation prohibiting race discrimination, but only against Cau-
casians and American Indians. 6
V. The Supreme Court Decision
On March 2, 1983, a deeply divided Supreme Court reversed
the district court's decision and upheld application of the ADEA to
70. 514 F. Supp. at 599-600.
71. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
72. Brief for Appellant at 22, 514 F. Supp. 595.
73. Id. at 22 n.1 1. The EEOC argued that Congress intended to act pursuant to both the
commerce clause and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment by identifying comparisons in the
legislative histories of the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e,
which clearly is section 5 legislation. Id. at 23-27.
74. Brief for Appellee at 23-26, 514 F. Supp. 595.
75. Id. at 24.
76. Id. at 24 n.20.
state public sector employment."' In concluding that the tenth
amendment did not preclude imposition of the ADEA upon the
states by Congress through its commerce clause power, the Court
continued both to refine its post-National League of Cities analysis
and to limit the impact of that decision.78
Justice Brennan, writing for a five justice majority,79 referred to
the principle of immunity set forth in National League of Cities as
"a functional doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a
sacred province of state autonomy .. ."10 Justice Brennan then ap-
plied the three-pronged Hodel test81 to determine whether a state or
local government is immune from otherwise legitimate congressional
commerce clause legislation and described this immunity as a "spe-
cialized immunity doctrine rather than a broad limitation on federal
authority." 8 The majority concluded that the first prong of the im-
munity test - that the legislation must regulate the "States as
States" - clearly was satisfied.83
The Court did not decide whether the ADEA regulated matters
that were indisputably attributes of state sovereignty. Although a
state's employment relationship with its employees may involve a
"core sovereign function," the Court declared that not every employ-
ment decision made under the guise of efficient management would
qualify as part of this sovereign function.84 The Court avoided this
issue by assuming that the second prong was satisfied and proceeded
to the third prong analysis.
The Court applied this third prong analysis and determined that
the ADEA would directly impair Wyoming's ability to "structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 8'
The majority opinion stated that this analysis involved "considera-
tions of degree"'86 and that the degree of intrusion in EEOC v. Wyo-
ming was considerably less serious than in National League of Cit-
ies. Here, Wyoming had means to achieve its goal of assuring the
physical preparedness of game wardens, 87 notwithstanding the
ADEA restrictions. Additionally, Wyoming was free "to continue to
77. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). The Court reviewed the district court
decision on a direct appeal taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
78. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 445 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981).
79. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
81. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n.10..
83. Id. at 4222.
84. Id. at 4222 n.1l.
85. Id. at 4222.
86. Id.
87. Brief for Appellee at 18, 514 F.Supp. 595.
do precisely what lit is] doing now, if [it) can demonstrate that age
is a 'bona fide occupational qualification' for the job of game war-
den."8 8 Wyoming's argument that the BFOQ exception was inade-
quate because of legal expense and delay caused by evidentiary diffi-
culties and inconsistent judicial resolution apparently was rejected.8 9
Distinguishing EEOC v. Wyoming from National League of Cities,
the Court concluded that Wyoming's discretion over the manner of
achieving its goals was not entirely usurped but merely was "tested
against a reasonable federal standard." 90
Further analyzing the degree of federal intrusion, the Court
found little evidence that the ADEA impacts adversely upon state
finances. Although the Court distinguished National League of Cit-
ies on this basis, the EEOC v. Wyoming opinion clearly states that
mere economic impact upon state financial resources is not necessa-
rily fatal to federal commerce clause regulation.91 The test is "essen-
tially legal rather than factual. 92 The Court further distinguished
National League of Cities by emphasizing the restrictive impact of
federal legislation in that case upon state choices affecting social and
economic policies, rather than merely general managerial goals.'8
The Court found no similar intrusion on state social or economic
policies choices in EEOC v. Wyoming.
Curiously, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the dissent in
EEOC v. Wyoming, had no difficulty identifying negative impacts
upon state policy choices, including the impediment of promotional
opportunities for younger workers into supervisory positions and of
fulfillment of affirmative action objectives. 94 If this line between in-
terference with state social and economic policy choices and mere
managerial efficiency is the key to Hodel's third-prong analysis, fu-
ture litigants and lower courts may have substantial difficulty dis-
cerning this distinction.
An additional question remains after EEOC v. Wyoming.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 1062 (emphasis in original). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
89. See Brief for Appellee at 16, 514 F. Supp. 595; see also 103 S. Ct. at 1070-1072
(Burger, C. J., dissenting).
90. 51 U.S.L.W. at 4223.
91. Id. See also FERC v, Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 770 n.33 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 292 n.33 (1981); Oklahoma ex rel. Phil-
lips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-35 (1941). The retention of older workers
would not necessarily result in increased economic burdens for the state, since the ADEA
permits the adjustment of pension, health insurance or retirement plans to avoid such burdens.
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976 & Supp. IV).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
93. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court discussed the FLSA amendments,
interference with state flexibility to offer jobs at less than minimum wage to persons with
below minimum employment requirements. 426 U.S. 883, 848 (1976).
94. 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Interference with affirmative action
objectives was one example of the social policy interference cited in National League of Cities.
426 U.S. at 847.
Would the federal interest promoted by the ADEA have been per-
ceived to outweigh the intrusion upon state sovereignty if the statute
had survived the Hodel test? 95 The impression left by the majority
opinion is that the federal interest would have survived the "balanc-
ing approach"; in dictum the Court indicated that the federal inter-
est is not diminished by the federal policy of imposing mandatory
retirement on certain federal employees.96
Since the Court concluded that the ADEA was a valid exercise
of congressional power pursuant to the commerce clause, it did not
decide whether section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides an
alternative analysis for validation.9 7 The opinion, however, did in-
clude dictum indicating that the district court's application of Pen-
nhurst was clearly erroneous" and that valid legislation pursuant to
section 5 did not require an express congressional recital of section 5
intent.99
VI. Conclusion
Although the EEOC v. Wyoming decision stopped short of over-
ruling National League of Cities,100 it clearly represents a serious
setback for those who seek to expand the concept of a tenth amend-
ment limitation on congressional power under the commerce clause.
The decision reaffirmed the methodology of tenth amendment analy-
sis, application of the three-pronged Hodel test, followed by a bal-
ancing of the federal interest against the degree of intrusion upon
state sovereignty. In refining its approach to the third prong - im-
pairing integral operations in areas of traditional functions - and
narrowing its approach to the second prong by defining "undoubted
attributes of state sovereignty,"101 the Court has limited substan-
tially the potency of National League of Cities for creating an omi-
95. See 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17. See also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
96. The court notes:
Once Congress has asserted a federal interest, and once it has asserted the
strength of that interest, we have no warrant for reading into the ebbs and flows
of political decision making a conclusion that Congress was insincere in that
declaration, and must from that point on evaluate the sufficiency of the federal
interest as a matter of law rather than psychological analysis.
103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17 (emphasis added).
97. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.18. See supra notes 51-55, 70 and accompanying text.
99. See Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). The Court declared that Pennhurst
is merely a statutory construction case and, therefore, was not applicable. See supra notes 71-
72 and accompanying text.
100. Justice Stevens stated as follows: "I think it so plain that National League of Cities
not only was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Con-
stitution itself, that it is not entitled to the deference that the doctrine of stare decisis ordina-
rily commands for this Court's precedents." 103 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. The Court suggested that not all employment policy decisions are within this defini-
tion. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
nous disruption of the constitutional system.""2
The future course of federal-state constitutional jurisprudence
in this area, however, is far from certain. The refinements of the
Hodel test set forth in EEOC v. Wyoming create some uncertainty.
By characterizing the third prong requirement as a matter of degree
and by distinguishing impairments of social and economic policies
from general managerial goals, 03 the Court has created judicial
standards that are far from unambiguous.
Additional uncertainty in this area results from this issue's divi-
sive effect on the Justices of the Court. The five member majority in
EEOC v. Wyoming consisted of the four National League of Cities
dissenters plus Justice Blackmun, who authored the pivotal "balanc-
ing approach" concurrence in National League of Cities.""4 Thus, if
any one Justice departs from the Court or changes his position on
the proper applications of the Hodel analysis and the balancing ap-
proach, then the course of federal-state relations may be radically
altered, and this delicate balance of interests again may be upset.
102. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
103. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104. Justice Stewart, who joined the majority opinion in National League of Cities, has
retired from the Court. Justice O'Connor joined the dissent in EEOC v. Wyoming and au-
thored a vigorous defense of "state sovereignty" in her recent dissent in FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
